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Simple agent based exchange models are a commonplace in the study of wealth distribution of
artificial societies. Generally, each agent is characterized by its wealth and by a risk-aversion factor,
and random exchanges between agents allow for a redistribution of the wealth. However, the detailed
influence of the amount of capital exchanged has not been fully analyzed yet. Here we present a
comparison of two exchange rules and also a systematic study of the time evolution of the wealth
distribution, its functional dependence, the Gini coefficient and time correlation functions. In many
cases a stable state is attained, but, interesting, some particular cases are found in which a very slow
dynamics develops. Finally, we observe that the time evolution and the final wealth distribution are
strongly dependent on the exchange rules in a nontrivial way.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies of the distribution of income of workers, companies and countries were first presented, a little
more than a century ago, by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. He asserted that in different countries and times the
distribution of income and wealth follows a power law behaviour, i.e. the cumulative probability P (w) of agents whose
income is at least w is given by P (w) ∝ w−α1. Today, this power law distribution is known as Pareto distribution,
and the exponent α is named Pareto index. However, recent data indicates that, even though Pareto’s distribution
provides a good fit to the distribution of high range of income, it does not agree with observed data over the middle
and low range of income. For instance, data from Japan2,3, Italy4, India5, the United States of America and the
United Kingdom6,7,8 are fitted by a log-normal or Gibbs distribution with a maximum in middle range plus a power
law for the high income strata. The existence of these two regimes may be justified in a qualitative way by stating
that in the low and middle income class the process of accumulation of wealth is additive, causing a Gaussian-like
distribution, while in the high income class the wealth grows in a multiplicative way, generating the power law tail3.
Different models of capital exchange among economic agents have been proposed trying to explain these empirical
data. Most of these models consider an ensemble of interacting economic agents that exchange a fixed or random
amount of a quantity called “wealth”. The wealth represents the welfare of the agents. The exact choice of this
quantity is not straightforward. For instance, in the model of Dragulescu and Yakovenko6 the wealth is associated
with the amount of money a person has available to exchange. Within this model the amount of money corresponds
to a kind of economic “energy” that may be exchanged by the agents in a random way and the resulting wealth
distribution is – unsurprisingly – a Gibbs exponential distribution. An exponential distribution but as a function of
the square of the wealth is obtained in a model with extremal dynamics where some action is taken, at each time
step, to change the wealth of the poorest agent, trying to improve its economic state9. In the case of this last model
a poverty line with finite wealth is also obtained, describing a way to diminish inequality in real societies10.
Aiming to obtain distributions with power law tails, several methods have been proposed. Keeping the constraint
of wealth conservation a detailed studied proposition is that each agent saves a fraction –constant or random– of their
resources12,13,14,15,16,17,18, Numerical results, as well as recent analytical calculations11, indicate that one possible
result of that model is condensation, i.e. concentration of all available wealth in just one or a few agents. To overcome
this situation, different rules of interaction have been applied, for example increasing the probability of favoring the
poorer agent in a transaction 17,18. However, to our knowledge, there are few detailed studies comparing the effect of
these two parameters, the risk-aversion parameter and the probability of favoring the poorer agent11. Besides, most
of the previous works do not consider the time evolution of the system, moreover many of them do not guarantee that
a steady state was attained indeed.
We present here a systematic study of an agent based model where exchanges are made by pairs of agents chosen at
random, so it is model with no underlying lattice. Each agent, i, is characterized by a wealth, wi and a risk-aversion
factor βi, while in the exchange there is a probability of favoring the poorer partner given by
17,18:
p =
1
2
+ f ×
|wi(t)− wj(t)|
wi(t) + wj(t)
, (1)
where f is a factor going from 0 (equal probability for both agents) to 1/2 (highest probability of favoring the poorer
2agent). Thus, in each interaction the poorer agent has probability p of earn a quantity dw, whereas the richer one
has probability 1− p. We focus on the choice of the quantity dw transferred from the loser to the winner. In most of
the previous work17 a kind of fair lottery is used: the amount of money exchanged correspond to the minimum stake
among the partners: dw = min[(1 − βi)wi(t); (1 − βj)wj(t)], so it is the same amount for both agents. However this
equal opportunity rule produces an evil after-effect: in the f = 0 case, “condensation” occurs: all available wealth
goes to one (or very few) agent, i.e. the Gini coefficient converges to 1. Also, for f 6= 0, even if the poorer partner
has bigger chances of winning, its gains are as negligible as its own capital, so chances of improving are very low19.
For this reason we also investigate an alternative rule, where dw is just the amount risked by the loser – (1−βj)wj(t)
– being j the loser agent. We call this rule loser rule. Actually, variations of this loser rule have been used in some
of the papers quoted above6,12,13,14,15, but there is no a good reason why a rich agent will risk more than its poorer
partner. Possible examples are marriage followed by divorce, the parties do combine their holdings and later divide
them, or, in the corporate world, mergers followed by spin-offs19.
In what follows we compare the results between the two rules in terms of the following quantities that we define
thereafter: wealth distribution H(w), Gini index vs. time, and wealth temporal correlation function. The wealth
distribution is probably the most important quantity for the global description of a economic system. H(w) vs. dw
gives the fraction of the population that have wealth between w and w + dw. However, this distribution is obtained
at a given time, both in real situations as well as in simulations, and in the case of simulations it is important to
know weather the results are stable or not. With this purpose we measure the Gini coefficient as a function of time.
It represents a practical way to verify the time dependence of the economic parameters. Finally, we also present
the wealth temporal autocorrelation function. For one side this is another possible measure of time dependence in a
system. Besides, it is more sensitive because it depends on two times, so aging properties, if there is any, could be
grasped.
II. WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS
All the simulations have been performed for a system of 1000 agents and the results have been averaged over
1000 samples. Wealth distributions are evaluated at the final stage, while at the initial condition, both wealth (wi)
and risk-aversion factor (βi) are uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval. Final stage means not further —or very
small— changes are observed as time goes by. Support for that assumption will be presented in the next section.
At first both rules seem to be qualitatively similar (one of them, the fair rule, was already discussed in ref.17). The
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FIG. 1: Wealth distribution for several values of the parameter f , with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. The straight line with
slope 2 corresponds to the slope of the f = 0.5 case, in the intermediate income region, for both rules.
main features of the wealth distributions emerging of the present model are: a) an almost uniform region for very
low incomes (w < 3× 10−1), being more uniform as f is bigger, b) a power law region extended over less than three
decades with an f -dependent exponent. The distinctive feature is in the intermediate income region which appears
less populated, at low f values, in the fair rule, when compared to the loser rule. The straight line depicted in both
graphs, with slope equal to two, is a guide to the eye, and it follows approximately the slope of the distributions in
the intermediate income region, with f = 0.5, for both rules. We would like to emphasize the f = 0 case, where both
distributions exhibit a power law, but the loser case has a bigger exponent (−2.17 compared to −1.93 for the fair
case) so indicating a less unequal distribution.
3III. GINI COEFFICIENT
The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a distribution and is often used to measure income inequality
by economists and statistical organizations because it gives a raw picture of the inequalities with a single number
between 0 and 1. It is defined as the ratio of the area enclosed by the Lorenz curve of the distribution (or cumulative
distribution function) and the curve of the uniform distribution, to the area under the uniform distribution20. In a
operational way we define the Gini coefficient as:
G =
1
2
∑
i,j |wi − wj |
N
∑
i wi
(2)
and it is evident that it varies between 0, which corresponds to perfect equality (i.e. everyone has the same income),
and 1, that corresponds to perfect inequality (i.e. one person has all the income, while everyone else has zero income).
Here we will use the Gini coefficient to measure the degree of inequality, but also to determine the stability of the
wealth distribution. With this objective in mind, we show in Fig. 2 the time evolution of the Gini index, where we
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FIG. 2: Gini index as a function of time for different values of f , with fair (left) and loser (right) rule.
can observe that the systems converge rather fast to a fixed value, indicating that, after a transient, the systems
arrive to an almost stable wealth distribution. A further analysis (measuring the slope) reveals that in some cases
stabilization is not complete, and that a slow dynamics is still present. This point is confirmed by the analysis of the
time correlation function presented in the next section. The effect of f on the Gini coefficient is the expected one, the
bigger the value of f , the bigger the probability of favoring the poorer agent in each transaction, and the lower the
Gini index. However, the loser rule produces, for low values of f , a considerable lower Gini index than the fair rule,
suggesting that an unfair lottery produces a more equal society than a fair one. Particularly, for f = 0 the fair rule
delivers a Gini coefficient equal to 1 (full condensation of the economy), while the loser rule produces a finite Gini
coefficient near 0.8. This is a result that can induce some second thoughts about the concept of equal opportunity19.
We summarize the comparison of the two rules depicting the Gini coefficient as a function of the f parameter.
In Fig. 3 we can see clearly that the Gini index decreases when increasing the parameter f , but the two rules give
unequal results: the fair rule spans on a wider interval of Gini index values than the loser rule. The crossing of both
lines at f = 0.3 confirms what was apparent in Fig. 1(a-b): for that value the same distribution emerges with both
rules. In fact most of the previous analysis of wealth distribution can be see clearly here: while the fair rule gives a
little bit more “humanitarian” distributions for high f values (more protective economies), the loser rule rescue more
agents from the poorest region in the case of small values of f .
IV. WEALTH TIME AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION
We define a time autocorrelation function for the wealth as follows:
corr(τ, t) =
∑N
i=1 wi(τ)wi(τ + t)
∑N
i=1 wi(τ)wi(τ)
The behavior depicted by the time correlation functions is very rich, in a way that is not perceive neither by the
distribution or the Gini index. The behaviour in the rules are very disparate, but in both cases clearly signs of aging
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FIG. 3: Gini index as a function of f , for the two rules: fair and loser.
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FIG. 4: Wealth time autocorrelation function (defined in text) for τ = 100 MC steps and different values of the parameter f ,
with fair (left) and loser (right) rule.
are observed (we checked this varying the initial time τ). While in the fair case the time correlation decreases, in the
loser case, after an initial and short decrease, the correlation function increases to values bigger than one. We remark
that in the fair case and for f = 0 the time correlation is stable and equal to 1, because the system condensates very
fast and the changes in the wealth of the agents are very small. But when increasing the value of f the time correlation
function decreases, suggesting a higher degree of social mobility as time evolves. On the other hand, for the loser rule
the time correlation exhibits slow dynamics (glassy behaviour, also observed for the fair rule in the case f = 0.1));
that means that the system requires a large time-period to attain an almost stable situation (as that represented in
Fig.1), and this characteristic time increases when increasing the size of the system, as expected. Another interesting
point is that, with the exception of f = 0.5, the value of the autocorrelation function is bigger than one, indicating
a kind of bias in the evolution: on average rich agents are becoming richer and poor agents poorer. This result,
combined with the conservation of the total wealth, explains the fact that the correlation function increases as time
goes by. A full discussion of these results, considering also different values of τ will be presented elsewhere.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our results clearly show that in many cases the system does not arrive to a steady configuration (a remarkable
exception is the case f = 0.5, when the probability has its strongest bias to the poorer partner). This point is not
decisive for the description of economic systems as usually they are not in a steady state neither they are conservative,
but the implications could be interesting for possible physical systems that behaves in a similar glassy way.
Probably the most relevant result is the fact that the loser rule appears to produce a less unequal wealth distributions
than the one we call fair rule. That is valid for values of the f < 0.3, which represent situations more close to real
economic systems. Thus, the loser rule behaves somehow like an unfair lottery, in the sense that the richer agent risks
more – in average – than its poorer partner, but has less chances to win. As a consequence, this bias attenuates the
inequalities induced by low f values. It seems to us that this result is an indication that the best way to diminish
inequality does not pass only through equal opportunity (fair rule) but through some kind of positive action increasing
5the odds of poorer strata of the society.
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